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Abstract.
Global environmental issues—like biodiversity conservation or climate change
—are in reality long term issues that are not properly taken into account with
traditional models that incorporate the impatience axiom manifested in fixed
discount factors and in the use of present discounted utility criteria. When both
the short and the very long run are important, one can appeal to overtaking
criteria and Chichilnisky criteria. Unfortunately, overtaking criteria are highly
incomplete. In order to decrease this incompleteness, stronger anonymity (or
equity) axioms were developed. I show that a maximal anonymity axiom com-
patible with Pareto is a non-constructible object; its existence relies on the
Axiom of Choice. The Chichilnisky criterion is based upon two axioms: non
dictatorship of the present and non dictatorship of the future. Here, the very
long run is captured by a finitely additive measure. Such a measure is a non-
constructible object and has therefore no explicit description.
1 Introduction
Global environmental issues are long term issues. Traditional discounting is unable to
take the long run into account. In contrast, overtaking and Chichilnisky criteria do se-
lect long run strategies. The next example recalls these observations. Then, we further
discuss (i) the incompleteness of the overtaking criterion, and (ii) one of the Chichilnisky
axioms (non-dictatorship of the present). In particular, we indicate a route to decrease the
∗I thank Norbert Brunner, Graciela Chichilnisky, Koen Decancq, Marc Fleurbaey, Johan Quaegebeur,
and Luc Van Liedekerke for helpful conversations. A first version was presented at the workshop “Intergen-
erational equity in climate negotiations, overlapping generations and social welfare” organized by Claude
d’Aspremont and Thierry Bre´chet (CORE, April 27-28, 2006). This text presents research results of the
Belgian Programme of Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated under the Science Policy Programmes
of the Prime Minister’s Office, Belgium. The scientific responsibility is assumed by its authors.
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incompleteness of overtaking, and we show that non-dictatorship of the present involves
non-constructible mathematics. We provide a balanced interpretation of these results.
Example. An economy uses trees as a necessary input to production or consumption.
The dynamics of tree reproduction are as follows. If n out of 2n subsequent generations
cut the forest at a maximal rate, the species become extinct after the 2n’th generation, in
which case there is zero utility at every period from then on. This strategy results in utility
streams of the form un = (0, . . . , 0; 1, . . . , 1; 0, 0, . . .) with the first (resp. last) 1 at the n+1
(resp. 2n)’th place, in which generations n + 1, . . . , 2n cut at a full capacity and exhaust
the forest. When the consumption of the forest is delayed and n becomes larger, the forest
slightly expands and more generations can benefit. Alternatively, generations can invest
in the forest and only cut at an equilibrium rate which allows the forest to survive. This
strategy results in the utility stream u∞ = (.20, .20, . . . , .20, . . .) in which each generation
reaches the same utility level.
We evaluate the different policies by means of the normalized1 discounting rule
u = (u1, u2, . . . , ut, . . .) 7−→ Dβ(u) = (1− β)(u1 + β u2 + · · ·+ βt−1ut + · · ·).
We obtain Dβ(u
n) = βn − β2n and Dβ(u∞) = .20. For each β in the open interval (0, 1),
there exists an n∗ such that βn
∗ − β2n∗ = .25. Optimization with respect to a discounting
rule leads to the elimination of this forest.2 If we judge the long term future important,
then we should use the right tools to evaluate a long run policy.
The literature on intergenerational equity provides such tools.3 Let me focus on two
criteria. First, the overtaking criterion considers an infinite stream u better than v if for
some T in N0, the undiscounted sum u1 + u2 + · · ·+ ut is larger than v1 + v2 + · · ·+ vt as
soon t ≥ T . According to this criterium, the sustainable stream u∞ is better than un for
each n. Second, Chichilnisky (1996) proposes a convex sum “Cλ,β = λDβ +(1−λ) Lim” of
the discounting rule and a value that captures the limiting behavior of the utility stream.
Since limt→∞ un = 0 and limt→∞ u∞ = .2, we obtain
Cλ,β(u
∞) = .2λ+ .2(1− λ) = .20, and Cλ,β(un∗) = .25λ.
As soon as the weight λ of the discounting rule is less then .80, the Chichilnisky criterion
Cλ,β ranks the sustainable stream u
∞ at the top.
Both criteria have their merits and shortcomings. First, the overtaking criterion com-
bines equity or finite anonymity and Pareto but fails completeness. This is an inevitable
consequence of the Lauwers (2010a)-Zame (2007) impossibility result: the existence of a
complete, equitable, and Paretian criterion relies on non-constructive mathematics (such
as the Axiom of Choice). Recent contributions in this track of literature concentrate
on constructible, equitable, and Paretian criteria. For example, the imposition of an
1An evaluation F of infinite utility streams is said to be normalized if F (r, r, . . . , r, . . .) = r for each r
in IR. Due to this normalization the discounted sum is premultiplied with (1− β).
2This conclusion extends to, for example, the widely used Dasgupta-Heal-Solow growth model.
3Asheim (2010) provides an excellent survey.
2
anonymity demand stronger than finite anonymity decreases incompleteness;4 e.g. Lauwers
(1997), Fleurbaey and Michel (2003), Mitra and Basu (2007), Banerjee (2006), Asheim,
d’Aspremont, Banerjee (2010), Asheim and Banerjee (2010), and Kagama and Kojima
(2009a, b). In this note, I explore the boundaries of combining different equity principles
and different Pareto principles without imposing completeness. I show that a maximal
equity principle, compatible with Pareto, is a non-constructible object.
Second, Chichilnisky (1996, 2009b) translates the requirement of equal treatment for
the present and the future into two new axioms for sustainable development. These two
axioms (non dictatorship of the present and non dictatorship of the future)5 in combination
of independence, characterize the class Cλ,β of sustainable social welfare functions. Unfor-
tunately, in many economic models of growth there does not exist a utility stream that is
optimal under this criterion. Recent contributions in this track of literature concentrate
on this issue of applicability; e.g. Heal (1998), Li and Lo¨fgren (2000), and Figuie`res and
Tidball (2010). Furthermore, Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2009) defend the axioms of
non dictatorship, propose a Bentham-Rawls criterion, and show the existence of optimal
paths. Similarly, Asheim, Mitra, and Tungodden (2010) introduce the concept of a sus-
tainable recursive social welfare function, of which Asheim and Mitra’s (2010) sustainable
discounted utilitarianism is special case. Their criteria also satisfy the two Chichilnisky
axioms and are applicable.6 Besides this problem of applicability, there is a problem of
non-constructibility. The “distinct future”-part in the Chichilnisky criterion is an integral
against a purely finitely additive measure. Such a measure is a non-constructible object.7
The results that ‘maximal anonymity’ and ‘finitely additive measures’ involve non-
constructive mathematics should be interpreted with care. The use of non-constructive
mathematics within economic theory is well known. For example, Debreu’s proof of the
second welfare theorem (each Pareto allocation can be realized as the market equilib-
rium of some economy) uses—similar to the proof of existence of Chichilnisky criteria—
non-constructive mathematics (see Chichilnisky, 2009a, 2010). In the practical context of
optimal growth, however, an explicit description of the ordering describing social prefer-
4Consider the streams w = (1,−1,−1, 1; 1,−1,−1, 1; . . . ; 1,−1,−1, 1; . . .) and z = (0, 0, . . . , 0, . . .). The
overtaking criterion is unable to rank w and z. An utilitarian overtaking criterion that satisfies fixed step
anonymity considers w and z equally good.
5A welfare function displays ‘dictatorship of the present’ if it is insensitive for changes that affect the
distinct future. A welfare function displays ‘dictatorship of the future’ if it is insensitive for changes that
do not affect the limiting behavior criterion.
6Burniaux and Martins (2010), Chipman and Martins (2010), Dutta and Radner (2010), Karp and
Zhang (2010), and Ostrom (2010) tackle the question of how to implement policies that respect the
interests of future generations and to assess their effectiveness in the context of global externalities with
long-lasting effects. Lecocq and Hourcade (2010) argue that optimal policies may require estimates of
future intragenerational distributions. Rezai, Foley, and Taylor (2010) show that, in some cases, such
policies may benefit all generations.
7Purely finitely additive measures are typically obtained via non-constructive mathematics (Hahn-
Banach’s theorem or ultrafilters, cf. Chichilnisky, 2009a, 2010). This observation can be strengthened:
it is impossible to create a purely finitely additive measure on N0 without recurse to non-constructive
methods.
3
ences would generally be needed in order to compute the optimal path (Fleurbaey, Michel,
2003, p794).
In view of these remarks, I propose the following positive interpretation. First, the
result on maximal anonymity should be seen as an additional defense of the ‘fixed step
anonymity’ axiom. Fixed step anonymity is stronger than finite anonymity, decreases
incomparability, and is based upon the constructible group of fixed step permutations.
Second, the Chichilnisky criterion can be made constructible by restricting the domain to,
for example, those infinite utility streams which exhibit a well defined and finite limiting
behavior (see Chichilnisky, 2009a). In this restricted domain, the limiting value is well
defined (without recurse to non-constructive mathematics) and captures the long run value.
Also, one can weaken the independence axiom and allow for alternatives to capture the
very long run behavior. For example, the maps lim inf and lim sup do not involve non-
constructive mathematics, violate independence,8 and fit in the Chichilnisky approach.
The next section collects preliminaries. Subsection 2.1 recalls the notions of a social
welfare relation and the basic notations. Subsection 2.2 characterizes Pareto-compatible
anonymity demands (Mitra and Basu, 2007). Surprisingly, an anonymity demand is com-
patible with strong Pareto if and only if it is compatible with weak Pareto. Subsection 2.3
recalls the Axiom of Choice and the notion of ultrafilter. Section 3 develops the main re-
sult: a maximal anonymity condition involves an ultrafilter on the lattice of partitions. As
a consequence, the group of fixed step permutations is not maximal. Section 4 concentrates
on the non-constructibility of purely finitely additive measures.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Social welfare relations
Let N0 = {1, 2, 3, . . .} denote the set of positive integers and R the set of real numbers. Let
the interval Y ⊆ R be the set of all possible utility levels. We assume that Y contains 0
and 1. The set X = Y N0 collects all possible utility streams and is called the domain. An
infinite utility stream x is a vector in X. Each x in X can be viewed as a map from N0 to
Y , associating with each t in N0 the element xt in Y . Vector inequalities are denoted ≤,
<, and . For each x in X, lim inf(x) is the infimum (and lim sup(x) is the supremum)
of the set of accumulation points of x.
A social welfare relation (SWR) is a reflexive and transitive binary relation in the
domain X. The symmetric and the asymmetric component of the SWR - are denoted by
∼ and ≺. The SWR - is complete if for each x and y in X we have that either x - y or
y - x. The SWR -1 is a subrelation to a SWR -2 if for each x and y in X we have (i)
x -1 y implies x -2 y and (ii) x ≺1 y implies x ≺2 y.
A permutation pi on N0 is a one-to-one map from N0 to N0. For each x in X, the
composite map x ◦ pi is a map from N0 to Y and can be written as the infinite utility
8The map lim inf (see Section 2.1) is not additive: lim inf(1, 0, 1, 0, . . .) = lim inf(0, 1, 0, 1, . . .) = 0; while
lim inf[(1, 0, 1, 0, . . .) + (0, 1, 0, 1, . . .)] = lim inf(1, 1, 1, 1, . . .) = 1.
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stream
x ◦ pi = (xpi(1), xpi(2), . . . , xpi(t), . . .) .
Let Sym(N0) collect all permutations on N0. The set Sym(N0) when equipped with the
composition operation becomes a group. The next definition collects a monotonicity de-
mand, two infinite versions of the Pareto axiom, and one concept related to permutations.
Definition.
• A SWR - is monotonic if for each x and y in X we have that x ≤ y implies x - y.
• A SWR - satisfies the Pareto axiom if - is monotonic and for each x and y in X
we have that x < y implies x ≺ y.
• A SWR - satisfies the weak Pareto axiom if - is monotonic and for each x and y in
X, we have that x y implies x ≺ y.
• Let Q be a group of permutations. A SWR - satisfies Q-anonymity if for each pi in
Q and for each x in X we have x ∼ x ◦ pi.
The Pareto axiom, also known as the strong Pareto axiom, postulates sensitivity in each
coordinate. The SWRs represented by the maps lim inf and lim sup combine complete-
ness, Sym(N0)-anonymity, and monotonicity, and violate weak Pareto. Indeed, the infinite
sequences z = (0, 0, . . . , 0, . . .) and y = (1, 1/2, . . . , 1/k, . . .) have one single accumulation
point (lim z = lim y = 0), have the same lim inf- and lim sup-values, and satisfy z  y.
Chambers (2009) characterizes both SWRs.
With respect to anonymity, we only consider groups of permutations that include the
group of finite permutations. Hereby, the permutation pi is said to be finite if there exists
a T in N0 such that pi(t) = t for each t ≥ T . Let Qfn collect all finite permutations. A
SWR is said to be finite anonymous if it satisfies Qfn-anonymity. The overtaking criterion
satisfies finite anonymity, the Chichilnisky criterion violates finite anonymity. Further-
more, a permutation pi is said to be fixed step if there exists a natural number n, such
that pi({1, 2, . . . , k n}) = {1, 2, . . . , k n} for each k in N0. Let Qfs collect all fixed step
permutations. Observe the inclusion Qfn ⊂ Qfs. Finally, for each group Q of permutations
we define the SWR -Q as follows: for each x and y in X, we have
x -Q y if and only if there is a pi in Q such that x ◦ pi ≤ y.
This relation is Q-anonymous, reflexive (the identity permutation belongs to the group Q),
and transitive (the group Q is closed under composition).
2.2 Pareto-compatible permutations
Anonymity axioms are based upon groups of permutations. In this subsection we charac-
terize permutations that are compatible with Pareto.
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Let pi be a permutation on the set N0. The vector (k, pi(k), pi2(k), pi3(k), . . .) is said to
be the cycle generated by pi on k in N0. Each permutation can be written as a succession
of cycles on disjoint sets (Hall, 1976, Chapter 5). For example, the permutation
pi1 = (1, 2)(3, 4)(5, 6) · · · (2n− 1, 2n) · · ·
switches the odd and even numbers: for each n in N0 the number 2n− 1 is mapped upon
2n and 2n is mapped upon 2n− 1. The final element in a cycle is mapped upon the first
element in that cycle. The permutation
pi2 = (1)(2, 3)(4, 5) · · · (2n, 2n+ 1) · · ·
keeps the number 1 fixed and then switches the even and odd numbers. A permutation on
N0 might generate a cycle of infinite length. The permutation
pi3 = (. . . , 9, 7, 5, 3, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . .)
maps 1 upon 2. Furthermore, pi3 maps an even number upon its even successor and an
odd number upon its odd predecessor, as such pi3(123) = 121 and pi3(100) = 102. We keep
the references pi1, pi2, and pi3 throughout this note. The decomposition of a permutation
into pairwise disjoint cycles is unique, except for the order in which the cycles are written,
also within each cycle the numbers are allowed to be permuted cyclically. As such, the
permutations (1, 2)(3)(4, 5, 6, 7) and (3)(1, 2)(5, 6, 7, 4) coincide.
A permutation representable by an infinite sequence of finite cycles is said to be cyclic.
The permutations pi1 and pi2 are cyclic, pi3 is not cyclic. Finite permutations and fixed step
permutations are cyclic. The set of all cyclic permutations is denoted by P . The set P is not
a group: the composition pi1 ◦ pi2 of two cyclic permutations results in the permutation pi3.
The next lemma highlights the main motivation to study cyclic permutations. The lemma
already appeared in Mitra and Basu (2007, Lemma 1). Their proof uses coordinatewise
convergent sequences of infinite utility streams. The proof below only uses 0-1-utility
streams and therefore strengthens their result.
Lemma 1. A permutation pi is cyclic if and only if there is no x in X satisfying x < x ◦pi.
Proof. The only-if-part is straightforward. If the permutation pi is cyclic, then it can be
decomposed as an infinite juxta position of permutations on finite sets. Each permutation
on a finite set is unable to conflict with the Pareto principle.
The if-part (if there is no conflict with Pareto, then the permutation is cyclic) is done by
contraposition. Hence, consider a permutation pi with an infinite cycle at m in N0:
(. . . , pi−4(m), pi−3(m), pi−2(m), pi−1(m),m, pi1(m), pi2(m), pi3(m), pi4(m), . . .).
Relabel this cycle (let 1 denote m) to obtain the cycle pi3 and consider the following table:
pi3 = (. . . , 9, 7, 5, 3, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . .),
x = (. . . , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, . . .),
y = x ◦ pi3 = (. . . , 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, . . .).
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The first line in this table is a cycle of infinite length. The second line presents an infinitely
long utility stream in X. This utility stream is made up of two sequences, a sequence of
‘ones’ is attached to the even positions (x2n = 1) and a sequence of zeros is attached to the
odd positions (x2n−1 = 0). The final line presents the permuted utility stream y = x ◦ pi3
(recall that yi = xpi(i)). The utility stream y dominates x (indeed, x1 < y1). 2
The infinite cycle pi3 generates a second domination result. There exists an x in X such
that x (x ◦ pi3):
pi3 = (. . . , 9, 7, 5, 3, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . .),
x = (. . . , 1
9
, 1
7
, 1
5
, 1
3
, 1, 2-1
2
, 2-1
4
, 2-1
6
, 2-1
8
, . . .),
x ◦ pi3 = (. . . , 17 , 15 , 13 , 1, 2-12 , 2-14 , 2-16 , 2-18 , 2- 110 , . . .).
Lemma 1, thus, holds when Pareto is weakened to weak Pareto. We summarize. Let Q be
a group of permutations. Then,
Q-anonymity Q-anonymity the group Q
and Pareto ⇐⇒ and weak Pareto ⇐⇒ only contains
are compatible are compatible cyclic permutations.
Within the class of transitive and reflexive relations, there is no trade-off between the
Pareto axioms and anonymity. Finally, if Q is a group of cyclic permutations, then (i) the
relation -Q extends the Suppes-Sen grading principle, (ii) is the smallest (for inclusion)
SWR that satisfies Q-anonymity and Pareto (Banerjee, 2006), and (iii) satisfies
• x ∼Q y if and only if there exists a pi in Q such that x ◦ pi = y, and
• x ≺Q y if and only if there exists a pi in Q such that x ◦ pi < y.
We only verify the first item. Suppose both x -Q y and y -Q x hold. Then there exist
two permutations pi and σ in Q such that x ◦ pi ≤ y and y ◦ σ ≤ x. Therefore,
x ◦ pi ◦ σ ≤ y ◦ σ ≤ x.
Since Q is a group, the permutation pi ◦ σ is cyclic. The inequalities become equalities,
hence y ◦ σ = x, and x ∼Q y.
2.3 The Axiom of Choice, ultrafilters
The Axiom of Choice (AC) postulates for each nonempty family D of nonempty sets the
existence of a function f such that f(S) ∈ S for each set S in the family D. The function
f is referred to as a choice function. AC does not provide an explicit way to construct
such a choice function and provoked considerable criticism in the aftermath of Zermelo’s
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formulation in 1904.9 AC implies a number of paradoxes such as the decomposition of
a sphere into a sphere of smaller size and the existence of a nonmeasurable set of real
numbers. The nonconstructive character of AC is further revealed by Dianonescu (1975)
who showed that AC implies the law of the excluded middle.10 Constructive mathematics
rejects the law of the excluded middle and hence rejects AC.
This note appeals to the non-constructible object “free ultrafilter”. We will use free
ultrafilters (i) in the definition of maximal groups of cyclic permutations (Section 3), and
(ii) in the definition of the “distinct future”-part of the Chichilnisky criterion (Section 4).
The definition of a filter and an ultrafilter is as follows.
Let S be a set. A filter on S is a nonempty family F of subsets of S that satisfies
• ∅ is not in F ,
• if A and B are in F , then A ∩B is in F (intersection property),
• if A is in F and A ⊆ B, then B is in F .
If, in addition,
• for each A ⊆ S, either A ∈ F or S − A ∈ F ,
then F is an ultrafilter. An ultrafilter is a filter that is maximal for inclusion. The family
of all subsets of S that contain a given element s of S is an ultrafilter on S and is said to
be principal. An ultrafilter F that is not principal is said to be free and satisfies ∩FA = ∅.
AC (reformulated as Zorn’s lemma) implies the existence of free ultrafilters on infinite sets.
The non-constructiveness of free ultrafilters is well known (Jech, 1973).
3 Maximal Pareto-compatible anonymity conditions
From Subsection 2.2 we know that Pareto-compatible anonymity axioms are based upon
groups of ‘cyclic’ permutations. This section introduces partition groups of cyclic permu-
tations. We show that a maximal (for inclusion) partition group of cyclic permutations
involves an ultrafilter on the lattice of partitions and is therefore a non constructible object.
The notion of a filter on sets extends to a filter on a lattice of partitions. Let us recall
the definitions (Halbeisen and Lo¨we, 2001). A partition of N0 is a family of pairwise disjoint
nonempty sets such that their union coincides with N0. If A and B are two partitions of
N0, we say that A is coarser than B (or that B is finer than A) and we write A v B if
each piece in A is a union of pieces of B. The coarsest partition of N0 (everything in one
9AC is (i) consistent and (ii) independent: (i) AC can be added to the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set
theory (ZF) without yielding a contradiction, and (ii) AC is not a theorem of ZF (Fraenkel et al, 1973).
10The law of the excluded middle states the truth of ‘P or not-P ’ for each proposition P and can be
used to claim the existence of certain objects without any hint to its construction. For example, the real
number c = √2
√
2 either is rational (in which case one sets a = b =
√
2 ) or is not rational (in which case
one sets a = c and b =
√
2). Conclude the existence of irrational numbers a and b for which ab is rational.
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piece) is denoted by 0 = {N0}, the finest partition (all pieces of which are singletons) by
1. Each partition is in between 0 and 1.
Let Ω0 collect those partitions of N0 that consist out of infinitely many finite pieces.
Partitions containing one (or more) infinite piece(s) are not distinguished, they are denoted
by 0. We endow the class Ω = Ω0∪{0} with two operations ∪ and ∩. The partition A∪B
is the coarsest partition in Ω that refines A and B, and the partition A ∩ B is the finest
partition in Ω that is coarser than A and B. In case the partition A∩B contains an infinite
piece, we put A ∩B equal to 0. The couple (Ω,v) is a lattice.
A filter on the lattice (Ω,v) is a collection F of members of Ω that satisfies
• 0 is not in F ,
• if both A and B are in F , then A ∩B is in F ,
• if B is in F and B v A (with A in Ω), then A is in F .
A family B ⊆ Ω is said to be a filter base if (i) 0 /∈ B, and (ii) for each A1 and A2 in B,
there is a B in B such that B v A1 ∩ A2. In case B is a filter base, then the family
B+ = {A ∈ Ω | there is a B in B such that B v A }
is a filter on the lattice (Ω,v). The filter B+ coincides with the intersection of all filters
that include B. A filter that is maximal for inclusion is said to be an ultrafilter. Each
ultrafilter F on (Ω,v) is free, i.e. ⋂ {A |A ∈ F } = 0.
We recall two facts on ultrafilters (Facts 2.1-2 in Halbeisen and Lo¨we, 2001, p321).
• A family F is an ultrafilter on (Ω,v) if and only if for each A in Ω either A ∈ F or
there is a B in F such that A ∩B = 0 (the ‘either-or’ being exclusive).
• If B is a family of elements of Ω with the finite intersection property (for each finite
subfamily {A1, A2, . . . , An } ⊆ B we have A1 ∩ A2 ∩ . . . ∩ An 6= 0), then there is an
ultrafilter F on (Ω,v) with B ⊆ F .
The second fact is implied by AC (reformulated as Zorn’s lemma). The notion “ultrafilter
on a lattice” generalizes the notion “free ultrafilter on a set”. The next example clarifies
this statement.
Example. Each infinite subset S = {n1, n2, . . . , nk, . . .}, with n1 < n2 < · · · < nk < · · ·,
of N0 induces a partition
VS = { {1, 2, . . . , n1}, {n1 + 1, n1 + 2, . . . , n2}, . . . , {nk + 1, nk + 2, . . . , nk+1}, . . . }.
Now, let FN0 be a free filter on the set N0. Then, the family of all partitions generated by
elements in FN0 , denoted by FΩ = {VS ∈ Ω | S ∈ FN0 }, is a filter on the lattice (Ω,v).
Moreover, FΩ is an ultrafilter on the lattice (Ω,v) if and only if FN0 is a free ultrafilter on
the set N0.
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The link towards cyclic permutations is as follows. Each permutation partitions the set
N0 : present the permutation as a juxta position of cycles and replace the brackets ( and
) by { and }. Each cyclic permutation partitions the set N0 into an infinite sequence of
finite sets. For example, the partition induced by the permutation pi1 is equal to
Part(pi1) =
{
{1, 2} , {3, 4} , . . . , {2n− 1, 2n} , . . .
}
.
Consider the partition A = {N1, N2, . . . , Nk, . . . } in Ω0. We will refer to
Sym(A) = Sym(N1)× Sym(N2)× · · · × Sym(Nk)× · · · ,
with Sym(Nk) the group of all permutations on the finite set Nk, as the symmetric group
of the partition A. The group Sym(A) stabilizes the partition A, i.e. this group collects all
the permutations with an induced partition that is equal to or finer than A. We shorten
Sym(Part(pi)) to Sym(pi). A group Q of permutations that includes Sym(pi) for each pi in
Q is said to be a partition group.
An anonymity condition based upon a partition group Q of cyclic permutations is
Pareto-compatible. In order to enlarge the group Q (towards a maximal subgroup of cyclic
permutations), we add a cyclic permutation to the group Q, and we consider the group
generated by Q and this additional permutation. The next lemma investigates the effect
of enlarging a partition group, its proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. Let σA and σB be two cyclic permutations on N0. Then, Sym(σB) contains a
permutation ρ such that ρ ◦ σA generates the partition Part(σA) ∩ Part(σB).
Adding a cyclic permutation to a partition group smuggles in permutations with courser
partitions. As such, one runs the risk of ending up with a non-cyclic permutation. E.g. the
addition of pi1 to the partition group Sym(pi2) generates the non-cyclic permutation pi3.
We continue with some further notation. Let B be a family of partitions in Ω. Consider
the set
{ pi | there is a B in B such that B v Part(pi) }
of all permutations that stabilize an element of B. Denote by QB the smallest partition
group that includes this set of stabilizers. If B is a filter base, then QB and QB+ coincide.
For example, let FS collect the partitions
{ {1, 2, . . . , n}, {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , 2n}, . . . , {kn+ 1, kn+ 2, . . . , (k + 1)n}, . . . }
with n = 1, 2, . . .. The family FS is a filter base and the partition group QFS coincides with
the group Qfs of fixed step permutations. Proposition 1 characterizes maximal partition
groups.
Proposition 1. Let B be a family of partitions in Ω. Then, QB is a maximal group of
cyclic permutations if and only if B+ is an ultrafilter.
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Proof. The if-part. Let B+ be a filter. Then, 0 /∈ B, and QB only contains cyclic permuta-
tions. If pi and ρ belong to QB, then Part(pi)∩Part(ρ) belongs to B+. Hence, QB is closed
for composition. Next, observe that the partition induced by a permutation coincides with
the partition induced by its inverse permutation. Therefore, QB is a (partition) group of
cyclic permutations.
Now, suppose that B+ is an ultrafilter. We have to show that QB is maximal. Therefore,
assume that the cyclic permutation pi is not in QB. The induced partition A = Part(pi)
does not belong to the ultrafilter B+. Hence, there is a B in B+ such that A ∩ B = 0.
Lemma 2 implies the existence of a permutation in Sym(B) such that the composition with
pi induces the partition 0. This composed permutation has an infinite cycle. Therefore, the
permutation pi cannot be added to QF to generate a larger group of cyclic permutations.
The only-if-part. Let QB be a maximal subgroup of cyclic permutations. We have to
show that B+ is an ultrafilter. Since only cyclic permutations are involved, 0 /∈ B. Next,
assume that the partition A is not in B+. We have to show the existence of a partition
B in B+ with A ∩ B = 0. A permutation pi that induces A does not belong to QB. Since
the group QB is maximal, there is a σ in QB such that pi ◦ σ is not cyclic. Conclude that
A ∩ Part(σ) v Part(pi ◦ σ) = 0 with Part(σ) in B+. 2
Mitra and Basu (2007) formulate the question whether the group Qfs of fixed step
permutations is a maximal (for inclusion) group of cyclic permutations. Proposition 1
answers this question in the negative. The filter generated by the family FS is not an
ultrafilter and the partition group QFS = Qfs is not maximal.
There is one further concern. We should check whether larger partition groups (and
stronger anonymity demands) reduce the incompleteness of the social welfare relation. Let
the partition group G ′ be larger than the partition group G. Then, the relation -G is a
subrelation to -G′ . The next proposition studies the indifference sets of these relations
and uses the concept of permissible permutations. The definition is as follows. Let - be a
SWR in X. The set of permissible partitions is defined as
Π(-) = {A ∈ Ω | for each pi in Sym(A) and for each x in X we have pi(x) ∼ x }.
If the SWR -1 is a subrelation to the Paretian SWR -2, then Π(-1) ⊆ Π(-2). If, in
addition Π(-1) is a strict subset of Π(-2), then -1 is a strict subrelation to -2 (i.e. -2
is less incomplete than -1). Proposition 2 investigates the link between partition groups
and permissible partitions. We use -B as a shorthand for the social welfare relation -QB .
Proposition 2. Let the family B of partitions in Ω be a filter base. Then, the relation
-B is reflexive, transitive, Paretian, and B-anonymous. Furthermore, the set Π(-B) of
permissible partitions coincides with the filter B+.
Proof. The conditions imposed upon B turn QB into a partition group of cyclic permu-
tations. This group QB coincides with QB+ . Mitra and Basu (2007, Proposition 3) show
that for each group G of cyclic permutations, the relation -G is reflexive, transitive, Pare-
tian, and G-anonymous. Apply their result for G = QB and conclude that -B satisfies the
properties as listed.
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Let us now verify that Π(-B) coincides with B+. The inclusion B+ ⊆ Π(-B) is immediate.
In case B+ is an ultrafilter also the reverse inclusion holds (otherwise, there exists a cyclic
permutation pi outside the group QB that keeps the indifference relation; as QB is maximal
QB ∪ {pi} generates noncyclic permutations and a contradiction is obtained).
There remains one single statement to be proved: the inclusion Π(-B) ⊆ B+ under the
assumption that B+ is not an ultrafilter. We show this inclusion by contradiction and
assume A /∈ B+. There exists an ultrafilter F that extends B and does not contain A (in
the family A of all filters which do not contain A each chain has a maximal element, so
by Zorn’s lemma A has a maximal element that appears to be an ultrafilter; cf. Ax, 1968,
Section 11a). The relation -B is a subrelation to -F , and A /∈ Π(-F). Hence, A does not
belong to Π(-B). 2
Propositions 1 and 2 justify the statements claimed in the introduction. Anonymity
demands are formulated in terms of groups of cyclic permutations. We focussed on partition
groups of cyclic permutations. Enlarging the partition group, strengthens the anonymity
demand, and decreases the incomparability. The strongest Pareto-compatible anonymity
demand based upon a partition group of cyclic permutations, involves an ultrafilter on the
lattice of partitions and is therefore a non-constructible object.
4 Measures on N0, the Chichilnisky criterion
A finitely additive measure µ on N0 assigns to each subset of N0 a nonnegative real number
and assigns to the union of two disjoint sets the sum of their numbers. The measure µ
is said to be countably additive if the measure of a countable union of pairwise disjoint
sets is equal to the sum of the measures of those sets. The finitely additive measure ν is
dominated by µ (and we write ν ≤ µ) is for each subset S of N0, we have ν(S) ≤ µ(S).
The finitely additive measure µ is said to be purely finitely additive if the inequalities
0 ≤ ν ≤ µ with ν countably additive imply that ν = 0. From Yosida and Hewitt (1952)
and Rao (1958) we know that each finitely additive measure uniquely decomposes as the
sum of a countably additive and a purely additive measure. This decomposition result is
at the heart of the Chichilnisky criterion: the discounting rule (non dictatorship of the
future) takes the role of the countably additive measure and the “distinct future”-part
(non dictatorship of the present) is a purely finitely additive measure.
Typically, a purely finitely additive measure is obtained by means of Hahn-Banach’s
theorem or by means of a free ultrafilter (e.g. Chichilnisky, 2009a, 2009b). We only describe
the second route.
A free ultrafilter F on N0 defines a limit on X. Consider a sequence x in X and all of its
limit points. Each limit point is the limit of a subsequence. There is only one limit point
with a converging subsequence xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xit , . . . for which the set {i1, i2, . . . , it, . . .} of
indices belongs to F . Define limF(x) = limt→∞ xit . Due to the intersection property of F ,
we have limF(x+y) = limF(x)+limF(y) for each x and y in X. The ultrafilter-based-limit
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limF defines a finitely additive measure:
µF(S) = limF
st with st =
#(S ∩ {1, 2, . . . , t})
t
,
and S a subset of N0. If the sequence s1, s2, . . . , st, . . . has only one accumulation point,
then µF(S) coincides with ‘the’ limit of this sequence and is known as the natural density
of S. For example, the set of even numbers has a natural density equal to .5; the set of all
multiples of 20 has a natural density equal to .05. Unfortunately, not every subset of N0
has a natural density. For example, the set
S1 = {1, 10, 11, . . . , 19, 100, 101, . . . , 199, 1000, 1001, . . .}
of all natural numbers having their first digit equal to 1 has no natural density. The
measure µF(S1) depends upon the particular (non-constructible) ultrafilter F and can
take any value between 1/9 and 5/9.11
Both routes to obtain purely finitely additive measures (Hahn-Banach’s theorem and
a free ultrafilter) rely upon AC. As a consequence, both ways to obtain a purely finitely
additive measure involve non-constructive methods. Obviously, one cannot conclude from
this that purely finitely additive measures are non-constructible objects. The knowledge
that non-constructive methods can be used to obtain a purely finitely additive measure,
does not answer the question whether a purely finitely additive measure can be obtained
without recurse to non-constructive methods.
The question whether or not a purely finitely additive measure on N0 is a constructible
object is tackled by Lauwers (2010b). Not surprisingly, the answer is negative: the existence
of a purely finitely measure relies upon AC.
Proposition 3 (Lauwers, 2010b). The existence of a purely finitely additive measure
on N0 entails the existence of a non-Ramsey set (from Mathias (1977) we know that a
non-Ramsey set is a non-constructible object).
As mentioned in the introduction, the question of how to evaluate policies that involve
the distant future is normative and should by no means be answered through the Axiom
of Choice. Only constructible and well defined criteria can take part in the discussions.
Although the maps lim inf and lim sup violate additivity (cf. footnote 8), they provide a
constructible way to capture the ‘distinct future’-part of an infinite path. A convex com-
bination of a discounting rule, lim inf, and lim sup remains in the spirit of the Chichilnisky
criteria. Furthermore, Chichilnisky criteria are constructible when applied to a restricted
domain, e.g. the domain of infinite paths which have a well defined and finite limiting
behavior. In such a restricted domain, ‘the’ limit of a path is defined, captures the distinct
future value, and does not depend upon non-constructive methods.
11In this example, lim inf(st) is the limit of the sequence 1/9, 11/99, 111/999, . . . and is equal to 1/9;
lim sup(st) is the limit of the sequence 1, 11/19, 111/199, . . . and is equal to 5/9.
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5 Appendix, proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 connects the partition induced by the product of two cyclic permutations to the intersection of
the partitions induced by the permutations. In general, the relation Part(σ1)∩ Part(σ2) v Part(σ1 ◦ σ2)
holds. For example, consider the following cyclic permutations:
σ1 = (1)(2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 4)(8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 12, 10, 9)(16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 20, 18, 17) · · ·,
σ2 = (1, 2, 3)(4, 8, 10, 11, 7, 5)(6)(9)(12, 16, 18, 19, 15, 13)(14)(17)(20, 24, 26, 27, 23, 21)(22)(25) · · ·.
The representation continues by repeating the underlined cycles taking into account a shift of +8. Here,
Part(σ1) ∩ Part(σ2) = N0 while both compositions σ2 ◦ σ1 and σ1 ◦ σ2 are cyclic:
σ2 ◦ σ1 = pi1 = (1, 2)(3, 4)(5, 6)(7, 8) · · ·, and
σ1 ◦ σ2 = (1, 3)(2, 5)(4, 11)(6, 7)(8, 9)(10, 13)(12, 19)(14, 15)(16, 17)(18, 21) · · ·.
Lemma 2. Let σA and σB be two cyclic permutations on N0. Then, Sym(σB) contains a permutation ρ
such that ρ ◦ σA generates the partition Part(σA) ∩ Part(σB).
Proof. Denote A = Part(σA) and B = Part(σB). We prove the lemma in case C = A ∩ B consists out of
an infinite number of finite sets. In case the partition C contains an infinite piece, the same ideas apply.
Without loss (otherwise re-enumerate N0), we assume the existence of an increasing sequence n1, n2, . . .,
nk, . . . in N0 such that the partition C can be written as
C =
{
[1, n1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
, [n1 + 1, n2] , . . . , [nk + 1, nk+1] , . . .
}
.
Both A and B are finer than C. We focus on one of the pieces in C, say S = [1, n1]. Again, without loss,
we assume that the restriction of σA to S is as follows
σA|S = (1, 2, . . . , k1)(k1 + 1, k1 + 2, . . . , k2) · · · (km−1 + 1, km−1 + 2, . . . , n1).
Denote the partition classes by S1 = [1, k1], S2 = [k1 + 1, k2], . . . , Sm = [km−1 + 1, n1].
We construct a permutation ρ in Sym(B|S) by induction. The partition A ∩ B—when restricted to S—
is equal to S. Hence, there exists a couple (`1, `1) in S1 × (S − S1) both belonging to one piece of B. Put
ρ(`1) = (`1). Let `1 belong to S1 = Si. Move on to the set S2 = S1 ∪ S1. Again, there exists a couple
(`2, `2) in S2 × (S − S2) that both belong to one piece of B. Put ρ(`2) = `2. This procedure ends after m
steps. Put the permutation ρ equal to (`1, `1)(`2, `2) · · · (`m, `m), elements of S that are not listed remain
fixed.
The permutation ρ ◦ σA generates the cycle S in one piece. Repeat the whole construction for the other
pieces in C and paste together the corresponding permutations to obtain the result. 2
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